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COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF-COMMANDER 
RELATIONSHIPS: 
WILSON AND PERSHING 
by Frank E. Vandiver* 
On May 27, 1917, Maj. Gen. John J. Pershing and Secretary of War 
Newton D. Baker called on President Woodrow Wilson. It was the first 
and last time General Pershing was to see the Commander-in-Chief before 
the Armistice in 1918. The interview was brief. Wilson commented about 
shipping to Baker, then turned to Pershing with some words about the 
Mexican Punitive Expedition and added: "General, we are giving you some 
very difficult tasks these days." Pershing made a soldierly reply and waited 
for some guidance in his new role as Commander of the American Expedi- 
tionary Force in Europe. No other Americ~n general had received quite 
so challenging an assignment, nor one so complicated by distance and Allied 
demands. But the President was laconic and ended the interview with a 
terse comment: "General, you were chosen entirely upon your record and 
I have every confidence that you will succeed; you shall have my full 
support."' 
Did the President mean what he said about support? Much depended 
on the kind of backing the AEF received abroad. By the time the United 
States entered the European War, the struggIe had mired into a mud- 
encrusted trench stalemate marked by astounding human sacrifice. French, 
British, and Germans alike had abandoned original hopes for a war of 
movement and concentrated on artillery and machine guns as efficient 
tools of slaughter. Lost to the war by 1917 were old concepts of reconnais- 
sance carried out by gallant troops of cavalry-though some generals clung 
still to fond hopes of the coup de grace delivered by the arme blanche-old 
concepts of maneuver. Where Napoleon's, Wellington's, Grants's, and Lee's 
armies usually fought fluid campaigns across great sweeps of terrain, new 
generals and their men now measured victory in yards of ooze and wire. 
The kind of war waged in Europe ran against American tradition. The 
Revolution, the War of 1812, the Mexican and Civil wars, the Indian 
campaigns, the Spanish-American encounter, and the Philippine Insurrec- 
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tion had all involved maneuver and movement. American training, such 
as had been administered recently, concentrated on open warfare. Pershing 
himself had drilled his Mexican Expedition in tactics of motion and harped 
constantly on the need for maneuver as essential for victory. Decisions 
could hardly be forced by men hunched behind sandbags and burrowed 
in bombproofs. 
Pershing's experience convinced him of the truth in his prejudices. He 
remained devoted to training for open field operations. But his allies were 
not so devoted. Years of trench life had changed the military mind of 
Europe. Open tactics succeeded in the 1914 campaign only until infantry 
and cavalry masses encountered machine guns and field works. When 
momentum waned it never returned. The war made new rules of martial 
conduct, and the Americans were going to have to learn them. And as 
far as the Allies were concerned, the Americans were going to have to 
participate in the war pretty much on Allied terms. What did the Allies 
have in mind? 
They were cagy at first. Initial military missions to the United States 
talked about an American Army participating as a partner in the enterprise 
of victory. But attrition and fears of defeat in 1918 brought expanded and 
noxious Allied  assessment^.^ 
But the full perfidy of Allied intents for America lay in the future. In 
the first heady days of American mobilization there were other concerns 
to plague Pershing and the Secretary of War. Scarcity of shipping certainly 
ranked high, as did the number of American troops scheduled to go abroad. 
A few absurd problems cropped up immediately: Which of several machine 
gun models should become the US standard? Which field piece should 
be adopted by the Ordnance Department? With such basic questions unans- 
wered, the country obviously was in a poor state of war readiness. And 
because it was, the attitude of the President toward war loomed especially 
vital. What did Wilson think about the war? 
He came to it reluctantly. When he read his war message to Congress, 
he put the conflict on a plane of ideals and lofty aims. If war was an 
instrument of policy, it was an instrument Wilson dreaded. Beyond public 
pronouncements, there was some indication that he disliked direct concern 
with military matters. His selection for the War portfolio in his cabinet, 
Newton D. Baker, had a sound reputation as Mayor of Cleveland and 
as a pacifist. For the War Office he lacked all obvious qualifications. Perhaps 
the President wanted a pacifist to tame the martial urges of the country? 
A distinguished student of history and government, the President was 
fully aware of his duties as war leader. How did he intend to discharge 
these duties? 
From the outset he chose to work through Baker. Direct relations with 
oficers and field forces he rarely cultivated. Later on, when General Peyton 
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March assumed a strong role as Chief of Staff, the President toIerated 
joint visits from Baker and March, but beyond that left military affairs 
largely alone. Perhaps he felt that too much martial contact would damage 
his role as peace-seeker. Perhaps, as he said, he preferred to "follow experts 
in a war of experts."" At any rate, he did delegate wide powers to Newton 
Baker, who, in turn, delegated wide powers to John J. Pershing. 
Pershing's earlier experience in Mexico prepared him moderately well 
for modern war-that expedition had taught him something of the problems 
involved in using combined arms in hostile territory, something of such 
newfangled tools as the field radio, the machine gun and the airplane. 
But that experience had not prepared him for a unique and special freedom. 
While in Mexico, Pershing worked under the most binding orders ever 
given an American general. American troops in Mexico could use onIy 
north-south roads; railroads were denied them; access to towns depended 
on permission of local authorities. A11 these regulations Pershing obeyed 
scrupulously. He chafed under them, thought Wilson's policy too timid, 
but did his subordinate duty to the letter. And now, with responsibilities 
beyond guessing, he received entirely different orders. Wilson did not send 
them, Baker did, and they were orders only in the widest definition. 
On May 27, 19 17, the day before the general was to leave for an inspection 
view of France, he received a letter from the Secretary of War which 
conferred on him the traditional powers of a field commander in wartime, 
plus those of a department commander; in addition, Pershing was given 
the extraordinary authority reserved to the commander of the Philippine 
Department. The general was specifically told that U.S. forces "are a 
separate and distinct component of the combined forces, the identity of 
which must be preserved." Baker's letter concluded with this paragraph: 
"You will keep the department fully advised of all that concerns your 
command, and will communicate your recommendations freely and directly 
to the Department. And in general you are vested with all necessary author- 
ity to carry on the war vigorously in harmony with the spirit of these 
instructions and towards a victorious conclusion."' 
So Pershing could set his own Iimits of authority and duty. 
In the months ahead Baker's "orders" proved ample. Pershing learned 
to interpret them loosely and Baker acquiesced. The relationship between 
Secretary and general became close, cordial, and effective. 
Consider how they functioned together. Their first test of friendship came 
over the issue of manpower assigned to France. The President, Baker, Chief 
of Staff General Hugh Scott, all had first thought in terms of sending 
a token force abroad-possibly a 12,000-man division." That idea faded 
even before Pershing left the United States, and shortly after he arrived 
in France and glimpsed the plight of the Allies, he recommended an 
American force of one million men in Europe by May 1918. He hinted, 
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even, that future planning should look toward an army of three million! 
Baker pointed out that manufacturing and shipping limitations might restrict 
expansion. But he accepted Pershing's escalating figures." 
Baker accepted Pershing's estimates on virtually everything concerning 
the AEF. Logistical details regarding wagons, horses, trucks, food, artillery 
and shells, all were left to him. The general negotiated with British and 
French authorities for local supplies, sent his own purchasing agents into 
the French back-country, and set about improving the tonnage capacities 
of southern French ports. 
Pershing also had a free hand with AEF personnel. But there were 
interesting early complications which Baker helped remove. Perhaps the 
most embarrassing case involved former President Theodore Roosevelt who 
wanted to organize a modern counterpart of his Rough Riders for duty 
on the Western Front. So famous a politician, so famous a hero, so doughty 
a warrior posed special strains on administration diplomacy. Wilson natu- 
rally left the matter to Baker, who asked Pershing's views. Pershing wanted 
no part of TR. That old campaigner likely would be too overwhelming 
for any commander to handle. Besides, he loved volunteers, and Pershing 
accepted the new professional ideal of a draft-raised army. And there was 
the matter of TR's age. He was simply too old for the fierce warfare of 
France. But TR  was not the only supplicant for appointment. General 
Leonard Wood and many lesser folk pressed for line and staff appointments. 
Pershing accepted those especially qualified, declined the rest.7 We specifi- 
cally declined to use Wood. 
Calls for preference continued, of course, after the AEF was in action. 
Baker hewed firmly to the line that the AEF's commander alone decided 
who ought to be promoted. Mrs. Arthur MacArthur caused the Secretary 
of War a difficult moment when, in June 1917 she asked him to promote 
"my son Douglas." Baker's repIy to the widow of a famed general was 
typical: "In the matter of recommendations for promotions of all kinds 
in the American Expeditionary Force I am relying upon General Pershing. 
Indeed, I do not know what discord and lack of harmony I might cause 
if I were to interfere with a personal selection among those officers under 
his direction and contr01."~ 
Secretary Baker's support of Pershing is best indicated in the long con- 
troversy over amalgamation of American troops with Allied units. As 
pressure mounted on the Allies throughout 1917-after the costly fighting 
along the Aisne and in Flanders-manpower shortages became critical. It 
looked logical to Lloyd George, Paul Painleve' and later to Georges Clemen- 
ceau, that so many fresh and eager American soldiers should be in action 
instead of kept in training and staging areas. True, American men needed 
training, but that could best be given in the trenches by experienced British 
and French fighters. American units, especially infantry and machine gun 
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companies, ought to be assigned as integral parts of Allied front line 
divisions. Language barriers in French units could be minimized through 
interpreters and combat esprit. American staff officers could be assigned 
with these men to learn the daily business of army housekeeping from 
tested teachers. Who could object, especially since Allied ships were bringing 
most Americans to France and since France supplied guns and shells for 
American use?" 
Wilson had already objected. He made his position clear to Baker, who, 
in turn, had prescribed an independent American army in Pershing's original 
letter of instructions. Pershing never forgot Baker's exhortation that "the 
forces of the United States are a separate and distinct component of the 
combined forces."'" 
Through a dreary series of Allied conferences Pershing argued for an 
American Army fighting on an American front. His campaign struck hard- 
pressed Allied commanders as stubborn, obstructionist, almost criminal. 
When the military situation deteriorated alarmingly by the end of 1917, 
when Russia's withdrawal from the war released fresh German divisions 
to the West, swift American participation loomed the only hope for the 
Allies. But Pershing hammered on his American theme. Clemenceau 
schemed for his removal; Lloyd George agreed; Field Marshal Sir Douglas 
Haig considered his American colleague intransigent and wooden; Marshal 
Ferdinand Foch fumed at Pershing's selfishness, Diplomatic pressure 
mounted on the AEF's commander. 
In  the diplomatic realm Pershing appeared vulnerable. Alone among 
western field commanders, he had no civilian superior looking over his 
shoulder. American ambassadors to Paris and London could not deal 
equally with heads of Allied states; the ubiquitous Colonel E. M. House, 
who carried so much unofficial authority from WiIson, was outshone by 
Britain's Lion and France's Tiger. Without powerful civilian support Persh- 
ing ought to have been overwhelmed at every high AlIied gathering. But 
in the conferences called to discuss Inter-Allied cooperation it became 
increasingly clear that Pershing held trump cards. He needed no civilian 
superiors present because he had the full backing of his government. 
Pershing felt that amalgamation would irk Americans at home, would 
perhaps embarrass Wilson's administration, might dissipate American field 
strength, and likely would make impossible the final concentration of a 
national force." He reiterated these objections each time amalgamation 
was mentioned. And there was power in'his position, Baker agreed with 
these objections, persuaded the President, and with their unremitting sup- 
port Pershing stuck to his crusade.lL 
When Allied diplomatic pressures against Pershing reached a peak in 
Washington, Wilson, through Baker, told the General that he had "full 
authority to use the forces at your command as you deem wise in consulta- 
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tion with the French and British commanders in chief," and added that 
Pershing was empowered "to act with entire freedom in making the best 
disposition ,and use of your forces possible to accomplish the main purposes 
in view."I3 With this kind of backing, Pershing succeeded in keeping the 
bulk of his men together-and though he may have irked his Allied con- 
freres, he pleased his civilian superiors. 
Pershing pleased Wilson and Baker in every decision save one-and that 
one failure was really the result of a misunderstanding. The trouble erupted 
late in the war when terms of an armistice were under discussion. Pershing, 
thinking he reflected an early Wilsonian urge to destroy German power 
in the field," prepared a letter for the Supreme Allied War Council in 
which he urged unconditional surrender by the Germans. This document 
caused considerable consternation. Wilson was now talking grandly of his 
Fourteen Points while his field commander talked of uncompromising 
victory. 
Most of the disagreement arose because Pershing was incommunicado 
briefly with the flu and during that period Colonel House did not see 
the General, and because Wilson and Baker had inadvertently answered 
Pershing's cabled views on armistice with what sounded like an open 
invitation to participation: "The President , . . is relying upon your counsel 
and advice in this matter, and . . . he will be glad to have you feel entirely 
free to bring to his attention any consideration he may have overlooked 
which in your judgment ought to be weighed before settling finally his 
views."'Pershing took this to mean that he could express his ideas to 
the Supreme War Council; Baker and Wilson meant it as a courteous 
invitation to private correspondence with them. At any rate, Colonel House 
finally smoothed the issue and Baker filed away the only letter of reprimand 
he ever thought of sending to John J. Pershing.IG 
So Pershing was supported steadily and left to do his work. Seldom 
in American history had a field commander been so independent. What 
prompted Wilson to turn his general loose? Where did the President get 
his ideas of command? Apparently he never specifically stated his command 
philosophy. But he had some distinct views on the nature of war and the 
nature of supreme command-views reflected in things he wrote before 
the First World War. 
Wilson's study of history helped him evolve his command theories. A 
southerner, Wilson nonetheless had special admiration for Abraham Lincoln 
and for General U. S. Grant. He recalled Lincoln's bumbling experiments 
in personal command until Grant took charge of the Union armies. "Grant 
was Lincoln's suitabIe instrument," Wilson wrote in 1896, "a great American 
general, the appropriate product of West Point. . . . a man of the common 
people, he deemed himself always an  instrument, never a master, and did 
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his work, though ruthlessly, without malice; a sturdy, hard-willed, taciturn 
man, a sort of Lincoln the Silent in thought and spirit."" 
Grant, then, was the ideal subordinate who did Lincoln's will. Pershing 
was much like Grant, both in efficiency and subordination-the Mexican 
Punitive Expedition proved the analogy, How should Wilson lead his 
general? The President had already given a hint in his book, Constitutional 
Government. "In respect of the strictly executive duties of his office," Wilson 
wrote, "the President may be said to administer the presidency in conjunc- 
tion with the members of his cabinet, like the chairman of a commission. 
He is even of necessity much less active in the actual carrying out of the 
law than are his colleagues and advisers. . . . His executive powers are in 
commission, while his political powers more and more centre and accumu- 
late upon him.'"s 
Here was Wilson's policy. There could be no doubt that the President 
was commander-in-chief, but the functions of that office were in the hands 
of the Secretary of War. Because of distance, the Secretary had to delegate 
much of his authority to the AEF's commander-as Lincoln and Stanton 
had delegated power to Grant. Still, there was no real precedent for the 
massive authority given to Pershing. He had to define his own job, and 
he was able to do that because the President and the Secretary of War 
were firm in the channels of responsibility. 
From the strict military formality which persisted from President through 
War Secretary to field commander came brilliant success, a success that 
gives special luster to Wilson, to Baker, and to their general. 
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